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Abstract This paper examines the role of informal job search methods on the
labour market outcomes of displaced workers. Informal job search methods
could alleviate short-term labour market difficulties of displaced workers by
providing information on job opportunities, allowing them to signal their
productivity and may mitigate wage losses through better post-displacement
job matching. However if displacement results from reductions in demand for
specific sectors/skills, the use of informal job search methods may increase the
risk of job instability. While informal job search methods are associated with
lower wage losses, they lead to increased job instability and increased risk of
subsequent job displacement.
Keywords Job displacement · Search methods · Job security
JEL Classification J29 · J45 · M54
Introduction
The sizeable individual welfare losses associated with worker displacement
are well documented. For instance, displaced workers experience difficulties
with re-employment, and after re-employment are often underemployed and
face significant wage reductions (Podgursky and Swaim 1987; Kletzer 1989;
Farber 1993; Jacobson et al. 1993; Burda and Mertens 2001). In addition, the
experience of displacement is associated with ongoing job instability (Stevens
1997), and there is evidence displacement has negative intergenerational
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effects (Oreopoulos et al 2008). This paper examines the role of informal job
search methods on the re-employment outcomes of displaced workers.
There is a long standing interest in the job search methods of unemployed
workers generally (Rees 1966; Bradshaw 1973; Datcher 1983; Holzer 1987,
1988; Montgomery 1991; Osberg 1993; Addison and Portugal 2002). A specific
focus of this literature is the effect of informal job versus formal job search
methods. This literature has focused on two outcomes, wages and tenure.
A number of papers have demonstrated that jobs found through informal
job search methods, such as the use of friends/relatives, have longer associ-
ated tenure than those found through formal methods (Datcher 1983; Simon
and Warner 1992). Two contrasting reasons have been suggested for this
relationship. The first emphasizes that informal job contacts may alleviate
uncertainty in the hiring process leading to superior job match quality. The
second suggests that the use of informal networks may reflect limited labour
market options, which leads to lower quit rates and hence longer tenure.
Evidence on wage outcomes is more mixed. There are studies that demonstrate
that use of friends/relatives is associated with higher wages, some who find
no relationship and others that find a negative relationship. Loury (2006)
demonstrates that a reason for this discrepancy may be variations in the quality
of social networks. Together this evidence suggests that both poor and good
quality social networks increase expected job tenure, but lead to variations in
wage outcomes.
Little is known specifically about the role of job search methods in post-
displacement outcomes, and there are a number of reasons why this is of
specific interest. First, one source of the negative consequences of displace-
ment relates to its potential to generate adverse signals of productivity to em-
ployers (Gibbons and Katz 1991; Abbring et al. 2002). Employers may suspect
selectivity in the lay-off patterns of the prior employer and take displacement
as a signal of undesirable working qualities in the individual. Hence, displaced
workers may find themselves stigmatized in the labour market. The use of
inside knowledge of job opportunities and personal references may represent
one way that the displaced can reduce adjustment problems and counteract
the negative information conveyed to potential employers by job loss through
displacement. Moreover, in the case that displacement was genuinely unre-
lated to work performance, the ability to use direct employer contacts or
employment referrals by friends or relatives may allow individuals to signal
their ‘true’ productivity to potential employers. Alternatively, social networks
may provide increased information about employment opportunities. In both
cases the use of informal job networks would be associated with shorter post-
displacement unemployment duration. Whilst, the former potential role for
informal job networks, as a productivity signal, would also be expected to
reduce post-displacement wage losses.
Second, it has been demonstrated that a major source of post-displacement
welfare losses are due to increased job instability in subsequent employment
spells (Stevens 1997). Individuals are more likely to have informal job net-
works in their own industry and/or occupation. Hence, the use of informal
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job search methods may be associated with a greater likelihood of being re-
employed in a job similar to that which the worker was displaced from. If
there is a general reduction in the demand for output associated with these
jobs, the use of these networks by displaced workers may contribute to further
job insecurity. Hence, while access to informal job networks may alleviate
immediate post-displacement problems related to the initial unemployment
spell it may also lead to poor quality job matches and ongoing job instability.
This paper presents evidence from Australian longitudinal data that
informal job search methods, directly approaching employers or using
friends/relatives, are associated with lower wage losses between the displace-
ment and re-employment job when compared to formal job search meth-
ods. However, re-employment through informal methods is associated with
markedly higher turnover rates, and in particular, an increased likelihood of
experiencing another displacement episode. Together these results suggest
that informal job search methods may help to alleviate the short term con-
sequences of displacement but may lead to more long terms problems with
ongoing employment instability.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section “Background
and Data” discusses the data used, Section “Results” presents the results and
Section “Conclusion” concludes.
Background and Data
The data source used is the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Survey
of Employment and Unemployment Patterns (herein referred to as SEUP).
SEUP covers the period from the start of September 1994 to the end of August
1997. The survey was conducted in three waves:
1. Wave 1: 5th September 1994 to 3rd September 1995;
2. Wave 2: 4th September 1995 to 1st September 1996; and
3. Wave 3: 2nd September 1996 to 31st August 1997.
Whilst 7,572 people were originally interviewed, the sample size was re-
duced by attrition to 6,056 by the end of wave 3.1 Individuals selected for the
survey were aged 15–59 and living in a private residence as at May 1995. SEUP
has an unusual sample framework. Respondents were split into two subgroups,
Jobseekers and a Population Reference Group (PRG). The PRG is a random
sample of the population, the Jobseekers group oversamples those who are
unemployed, “it comprises individuals who were considered to be potential
candidates for a labour market program at the time of recruitment” (Le and
Miller 1998). It must be noted that the PRG and Jobseeker group are not
mutually exclusive, the PRG contains some Jobseekers.
1A shortcoming of SEUP is that its relatively brief length makes it impossible to explore issues
that are clearly important such as longer term wage dynamics or career problems related to job
search methods.
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In SEUP we observe all episodes of turnover, further information is then
available on reason for ceasing the job. These include a variety of reasons
of quitting behavior, end of temporary/seasonal work, ill health or injury,
‘other’ reasons and retrenchment. We classify workers who are ‘retrenched’ as
displaced. This question uses the standard ABS labour force definition of re-
trenchment, whereby loss of work through retrenchment consists of dismissal
due to business closing, dismissal for reasons of insufficient labour demand
that does not involve a business closure and dismissal for poor performance
for reasons unrelated to business conditions. The latter case is not generally
considered a job loss due to displacement and differs in this way from the
standard US definition of displacement.2 However, Borland and McDonald
(2001) report ABS findings that three quarters of ABS defined retrenchment
is associated with the former two categories. It is also worth noting that this
definition of displacement does not rely upon tenure in current job. For in-
stance workers do not have to have been in employment at the firm for at least
three years prior to job loss to be considered displaced. Our sample consists
of all individuals who lose a job through displacement during the first two
waves of SEUP. This provides 1,584 individuals. In the case of an individual
experiencing multiple displacement episodes we constrain our analysis to the
first episode. In line with existing research on job displacement and to avoid
empirical difficulties related to re-employment selectivity amongst displaced
women we focus on male displaced workers only, leaving 987 individuals.
Appendix Table 7 provides selected summary statistics for this sample.
Before continuing it is worth mentioning the unemployment benefits
scheme in Australia as it was at the time of SEUP. First, unemployment
insurance was not means tested. Second, there was no unemployment insur-
ance cut-off period in Australia or reduction in the replacement ratio over
time. Individuals continue to have access to the same level of unemploy-
ment benefits irrespective of time in unemployment. Detailed information
on unemployment insurance receipt was not available in the Confidentialised
Unit Record File (CURF) version of SEUP made available to the researcher.
Likewise employment programmes information was not available.
A strength of SEUP as a data source lies in its episodic structure. For each
of the waves, information is gathered for every employment, unemployment,
not in labour force, training and social security episode experienced by the
individual within the sample period. We observe, and have the characteristics
of, every labour market episode that occurs during SEUP’s sample period.3
In addition, SEUP contains detailed information on job search methods
and it also identifies the method used to gain any employment episodes.
Hence there is a distinction between job search methods, which relate to
2Also SEUP does not contain any information on plant closures or mass layoffs.
3One key shortcoming of SEUP is that its relatively short length makes it impossible to explore
issues that are clearly important such as longer term wage dynamics or career profiles related to
job search methods.
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Table 1 Job search and job finding methods—displaced workers
Number (%) Number (%) Number (%) Number (%)
using search finding a job using a job employed by
method search method job finding
who found job method
by that method
Formal methods 181 (17.5%) 270 (17.3%)
Newspaper advertisement 811 (52.0%) 595 (73.4%)
PEA 960 (61.5%) 712 (74.2%)
Advertised/tendered 144 (9.2%) 112 (77.8%)
for work
Informal methods
Direct employer contact 1,044 (66.9%) 787 (75.4%) 182 (17.4%) 254 (16.2%)
Friends or relatives 602 (38.6%) 446 (74.1%) 100 (16.6%) 273 (17.4%)
Other 119 (7.6%) 101 (84.9%) 20 (16.8%) 260 (16.6%)
Individuals 1,584
Source: SEUP
ex ante search behavior (i.e. before finding a job), and job finding methods,
which report the actual method used to gain a given job. The specific job
search methods reported in SEUP are direct employer contact; answering
newspaper advertisements; checking factory or Public Employment Agency
(PEA) noticeboards (which at the time of SEUP was the Commonwealth
Employment Service, CES); registering with the PEA; contacting other em-
ployment agencies; advertised or tendered for work; and contacted friends or
relatives. This information is recorded for every unemployment episode; and
for every employment episode a job finding method is recorded. Job search
methods are not mutually exclusive. Unemployed individuals can be recorded
as undertaking multiple job search methods. Only one job finding method is
recorded for each employment episode.
Table 1 provides information on the ex ante job search method used by
our sample of displaced workers, along with summary information on ex
post job finding methods for displaced workers. Specifically, the job search
method refers to any use of that job search method during the displacement-
unemployment episode. Hence, it is a measure of incidence, not intensity,
of use. The data suggest that the use of the PEA (61%), direct employer
contact (67%) and answering newspaper advertisements (52%) are the main
job search methods used by displaced workers. Green (2011) reports corre-
sponding job search use for all unemployed job seekers in SEUP, the key
differences are that displaced workers are less likely to use direct employer
contact or the PEA, but are more likely to answer newspaper advertisements.
Displaced job seekers do not generally follow a single strategy for seeking a
job. On average, the displaced used 2.49 different search methods.4 It is worth
4Green (2011) also uses SEUP and reports that all the unemployed use 2.79 different methods.
Both of these figures are slightly higher than that reported by Addison and Portugal (2002) for
Portugal (2.05).
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noting that as this data refers to job search use during the unemployment spell,
search methods that are associated with longer unemployment duration will
be over-represented. In the last three columns we report data that provides
some indication of the relative effectiveness of job search methods. This data
suggests that there are only small differences in the effectiveness of job search
methods in terms of gaining employment. Of course, the fact that individuals
use multiple job methods make any inference about effectiveness of job search
methods based on this type of information at best approximate.
In the following analysis we aggregate search methods. Specifically, we
group the use of the PEA and advertisements into one category, ‘formal’
job finding methods. This is necessary due to relatively small numbers of
displaced workers finding work through each of these methods separately.
As a result, job finding is assigned as being due to one of four types of
job search methods: formal, direct approach, friends/relatives or other. Our
primary interest is in the effect of the two ‘informal’ job search methods,
direct approach and contacting friends/relatives on job search and subsequent
labour market outcomes of displaced workers. As a result, formal methods
are used as the omitted category in the empirical analysis of wages and post-
employment stability. In addition, individuals may exit unemployment into
self-employment, business ownership or other non-employee forms of work.
Although these can really be considered as having an associated job search
strategy, we treat these as a separate form of job finding method rather than,
for instance, treating them as censored unemployment spells.
Table 2 presents an overview of characteristics of the first re-employment
job, along with information on general job stability after displacement, sum-
marized by job finding method. It is immediately noticeable that a large
proportion of these job spells finish before the end of the sample period
(between 72 and 82 per cent). Moreover, the length of these job spells is
relatively short, just over half a year. Job length appears particularly short
for re-employment found through direct approach or friends/relatives. These
job finding methods are also associated with a higher likelihood of subsequent
Table 2 Characteristics of re-employment job, displaced male workers
How re-employment job was found
Formal Direct Friends Other
approach
Re-employed in same occupation group 0.43 0.42 0.48 0.47
Re-employed in lower skill occupation 0.31 0.21 0.23 0.30
Re-employed in same industry 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.43
Underemployed in displaced job 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.13
Underemployed in re-employed job 0.15 0.29 0.25 0.23
Separated from re-employment job (in sample) 0.73 0.82 0.77 0.72
Duration of first re-employment job (days) 239.96 197.48 184.60 230.80
Displaced from re-employment job 0.20 0.34 0.32 0.22
Observations 168 163 182 151
Source: Seup
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displacement, perhaps reflecting a bias in informal job networks towards short-
term or unstable jobs. A little under half of displaced workers are re-employed
in the same occupation group, whilst around a quarter are re-employed in a
lower skill occupation. It is noticeable that job finding through either direct
approach or friends/relatives is associated with a higher likelihood of re-
employment in the same industry and occupation when compared to formal
job finding methods. This is supportive of the view that workers’ informal
job networks are stronger and/or more effective within the same industry
and occupation that they were displaced from. The link between changing
occupation, industry and re-employment methods are investigated in more
detail below.
Results
The Wage Impact of Re-employment Method
A key issue for displaced workers is the loss of earnings that occurs across dis-
placement and re-employment jobs. We seek to gauge the link between search
methods and post-displacement wage losses. First, we examine the effect of the
job finding method on the change between pre and post-displacement wages.
This can be specified as:
lnWri − ln Wdi = α0 + β Xi + δ JSMi + εi (1)
Where the superscripts r and d refer to the re—employment and displacement
episode, respectively; ln Wi is the log weekly wage of the ith individual; Xi is
a vector of controls; JSMi is the job finding method for the ith individual;
and εi is an I.I.D. error term. Through this approach our primary aim is to
examine how job search methods mitigate (or worsen) post-displacement wage
losses. The controls in the vector Xi are generally standard, however one
deserves further discussion. Changes in wages between displacement and re-
employment jobs will be related to the loss of job, occupation and industry
specific human capital. To address this we include tenure in the displacement
job in the control vector.
Column 2 of Table 3 presents OLS estimates of Eq. 1. The sample for this
model excludes individuals who exited to a ‘non-employee’ labour market
state as these individuals did not generally report wage earnings.5 There is
evidence that finding re-employment via direct approach, friends/relatives or
‘other’ methods is associated with a higher wage change (11–13%) when com-
pared to displaced workers who were re-employed using formal methods, the
omitted category. Other estimates suggest that displaced workers with degree
qualifications experience substantial wage rate growth, all other things being
5Furthermore, in the case that wage/salary earnings were reported it is not clear whether self-
employed were receiving other remuneration, such as profits, from their employment.
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Table 3 Log weekly wage change: displaced job to re-employment job, age 20–59
Wage change Probit Heckman
(re-employed) wage change
Direct approach 0.11*** [0.06] 0.11*** [0.06]
Friends 0.13**[0.06] 0.13** [0.06]
Other 0.12**[0.06] 0.12*** [0.07]
High school 0.11 [0.07] 0.13 [0.13] 0.12*** [0.07]
Diploma/vocational training 0.001[0.04] 0.37* [0.11] 0.05 [0.06]
Degree 0.32**[0.15] 0.33*** [0.20] 0.36* [0.10]
Urban 0.06[0.06] 0.30* [0.11] 0.10*** [0.06]
NESB 0.02[0.06] −0.29* [0.12]
Age 30 to 39 −0.06 [0.06] −0.18 [0.12] −0.07 [0.06]
Age 40 to 49 −0.08 [0.06] −0.27** [0.13] −0.10 [0.07]
Age 50 to 59 0.08 [0.14] −0.67* [0.17] 0.01 [0.10]
Job seeker 0.13 [0.08] 0.44* [0.10] 0.17*** [0.09]
Tenure (years) in displaced job −0.01** [0.005] 0.002 [0.009] −0.01***[0.005]
Unemployment duration 0.05 [0.05] 0.04 [0.05]
Working partner 0.44* [0.13]
Constant −0.27**[0.11] −0.13.[0.18] −0.47 [0.14]
ρ 0.42 [0.16]
r2 0.05
Observations 623 906 623
Notes: [ ] are the standard errors. *,**, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively
Omitted categories in sets of dummy variables are formal methods, less than high school comple-
tion, age 20–29
equal, between the displaced and reemployment job. Having longer tenure
and hence more job-specific human capital in the displaced job is associated
with wage rate reductions, although the magnitude of this effect is not large.
More explicitly, one may want to control for whether the worker changed
occupation or industry between the two jobs. Variants of Eq. 1 were estimated
that included controls for whether the worker changed industry or occupation
between displacement and re-employment job. Whilst the estimates were
negative signed, as would be expected, neither were statistically significant at
standard levels.
If reservation wages vary across time in unemployment this may lead
to a link between job search methods that have lower average associated
unemployment duration and the average wages associated with gaining a job
through these methods. To investigate this we included a control for duration
of time in unemployment following displacement. The resultant estimates for
unemployment duration are not statistically significant. Critically, the inclusion
or exclusion of this control did not change the magnitude and statistical
significance of the point estimates for job finding methods. This was also true
of the inclusion of controls for changing industry and occupation. Hence, it
does not appear that the higher wages, all others equal, related to informal
job finding methods relative to formal methods are a result of variations in
unemployment duration or the likelihood of changing industry/occupation
across job finding methods.
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A potential problem with the OLS estimates is that we do not observe
re-employment wages if the displaced worker does not re-enter employment
within the sample period. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that these individuals
will be a random subsample of displaced workers insofar as they are more
likely to possess characteristics (both observed and unobserved) that make it
less probable that they will find employment. In the case that these individuals
are a non-random subsample of displaced workers, OLS estimates of wages
changes will be biased. To investigate this, we utilize a two-stage model
that aims to control for sample selectivity in the estimates of wage change
(Heckman 1979). The first stage is to estimate the probability of re-
employment:
Pr(Ei) = γ0 + β Xi + π Zi + μi (2)
We do not observe the underlying probability of being employed, E∗i ,
instead we observe a dummy variable, Ei, defined as Ei = 1 if E∗i > 0 and
Ei = 0 otherwise. Equation 2 is estimated by maximum likelihood and the
inverse mill’s ratio is used to correct Eq. 1. This approach seeks to correct
the estimates of the covariates in the wage equation for bias due to the non-
random partial observability of wages.
Whilst this model can be identified by functional form alone, we choose
to introduce an instrumental variable (Z). However, SEUP does not contain
many obvious candidates for instruments. We use whether the individual had
a working partner. This is not an uncontroversial choice but it fulfills the
basic statistical requirements of an instrumental variable insofar as it has a
statistically significant relationship to the probability of being re-employed
(p-value = 0.000), but appears statistically unrelated to wage changes between
displacement and re-employment jobs. Previously, it has been shown that
the presence of a working spouse affects re-employment probability and
unemployment duration, but generally a working spouse has been found to
decrease re-employment probability.6 However, previous Australian research
demonstrates substantial positive correlations between female employment
and male employment within households (Dawkins et al. 2005). Our data fits
with this previous Australian evidence insofar as having a working partner
increases the probability of male re-employment.
Column 3 and 4 of Table 3 present the estimates from the selection equation
and the wage change regression that incorporates a correction for sample
selection. While there are some changes in the point estimates of other
covariates in this model, the job finding method estimates remain unchanged
from the OLS regression.
Overall there appears to be evidence that informal job search networks,
when compared to formal methods, may reduce wage losses between displace-
6For instance Solon (1985) finds that having a working spouse has a negative effect on gaining
re-employment, but only for women, while Dynarski and Sheffrin (1990) finds that individuals
with working spouses are less likely to gain re-employment if they are in receipt of unemployment
insurance.
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ment and re-employment spells. This appears to run counter to suggestions
that employee referrals and social networks are associated with lower wages
(Bentolila et al. 2010). Instead our estimates are more supportive of a view
of informal job networks as allowing displaced workers to signal their pro-
ductivity and providing superior information on match quality. If this latter
case is true, we might expect relative flat wage-tenure profiles for displaced
workers who found re-employment through friends/relatives. Unfortunately,
SEUP does not have a sufficiently long duration for this to be investigated.
Re-employment Characteristics, Displacement Risk and Job Duration
Stevens (1997) presents evidence that a major source of welfare losses for
displaced workers is ongoing job instability. Search methods used to enter re-
employment may be a critical factor in so far as individuals are more likely
to have informal job networks in the industry and/or occupations from which
they were displaced. As a result, jobs found through these methods are likely to
be associated with an elevated risk of displacement, particularly as firms may
operate last in, first out firing policies in the face of poor demand conditions.
More generally, job instability may occur due to matching difficulties inherent
in the job search process (Jovanovic 1979; Pries 2004). In this case we would
expect there to be a link between displacement and ongoing instability, but this
would not necessarily be associated with any given job search method.
We examine these issues in two main ways, first we model the risk of
turnover from re-employment job, without distinguishing between different
reasons for turnover. Through this, we seek to determine if there are any
general associations between search methods and job instability for the dis-
placed. Second, we explicitly examine the impact of search method on risk of
displacement in the re-employment job.
To model the likelihood of turnover from the re-employment job, we
utilize a single risk proportional hazards model to estimate time until turnover
from the start of the re-employment job and include job search methods as
regressors. We see no reason to assume a particular functional form for the
hazard function, as a result we use a discrete interval duration approach (Han
and Hausman 1990). In turn, we introduce a gamma frailty term in an attempt
to control for unobserved heterogeneity. To the extent that an employer-
employee turnover represents a revealed poor job match and the time taken to
reveal this will generally be inversely related to how ’poor’ this match is, this
approach provides some evidence on the link between job search method and
job match quality for displaced workers.
Figure 1 presents the estimated baseline hazard from this model. This is
plotted for both the baseline hazard from the homogeneous model (dotted
line) and the model including a control for individual level unobserved het-
erogeneity (smooth line). The first thing to note is the magnitude of the
probability of exit from the first post-displacement job. Even after introducing
a control for unobserved heterogeneity the expected underlying probability
of exit from the post-displacement job is over 30% within the first 90 days.













Fig. 1 Baseline hazard, separation from first re-employment job
Both models suggests a degree of negative duration dependence. The ongoing
magnitude of risk of exit between 15% and 25% for the first 18 months of the
post-displacement job supports the view that post-displacement employment
is characterized by instability (Stevens 1997) .
Table 4 Exit from
re-employment job, hazard
estimates
Notes: [ ] are the standard
errors. *,**, *** denote
significance at the 1%, 5%










Age 30 to 39 −0.18 [0.15]
Age 40 to 49 −0.30***[0.17]
Age 50 to 59 −0.17 [0.22]
Reemployed job characteristics
Manufacturing −0.32** [0.15]
Part time 0.08 [0.14]
Professional/manager −0.46** [0.27]
Para professional −0.11 [0.15]
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Table 4 presents the covariate estimates from this model. The results suggest
that when compared to job finding through formal search methods, informal
job search methods are associated with a higher risk of subsequent turnover.
Hence, while results presented earlier suggested that informal job search meth-
ods were associated a reduced loss of wages, they are associated with less stable
post-displacement employment. Separate models were also estimated (but not
reported) including controls for whether the individual changed occupation or
industry. These provided some indication that changing occupation reduces
the likelihood of turnover, but had no impact on the estimates of job search
method effects.
A critical issue is the extent to which individuals who are displaced face
ongoing, or even an increased, risk of being displaced in later jobs. Table 5
presents results from a probit regression, where the dependent variable is
a dummy that indicates whether individuals lost their first re-employment
job through displacement (displacement risk). To aid interpretation all es-
timates are reported as marginal effects. Re-employment through informal
methods, friends/relatives or direct approach, is associated with a subsequent
displacement risk of between 14 and 16 percentage points higher than those re-
employment jobs found through formal methods. This suggests that displaced
workers who use informal job search methods to find re-employment may be
exposing themselves to an increased risk of further displacement episodes. We
present two variants of this model, where each include a variable indicating
whether the worker changed occupation and/or industry, respectively, when
Table 5 Risk of displacement
from re-employment
job—marginal effects
Notes: [ ] are the standard
errors. *,**, *** denote
signficance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively
Omitted categories in sets of
dummy variables are formal
methods, less than high
school completion,
age 20–29 and low skill
occupation
(I) (II)
JSM—direct approach 0.16*[0.06] 0.16*[0.06]
JSM—friends 0.14*[0.05] 0.14*[0.05]
JSM—other 0.04 [0.06] 0.04 [0.06]
High school −0.01[0.05] −0.02 [0.05]
Diploma/vocational training −0.08*** [0.04] −0.09**[0.04]
Degree −0.04 [0.08] −0.06 [0.08]
Urban 0.08***[0.04] 0.08***[0.04]
NESB −0.09*** [0.05] −0.09*** [0.05]
Age 30 to 39 0.07 [0.05] 0.07 [0.05]
Age 40 to 49 0.03 [0.08] 0.04 [0.08]
Age 50 to 59 0.08 [0.05] 0.06[0.05]
Reemployed job characteristics
Manufacturing 0.04 [0.05] 0.03 [0.05]
Professional/manager −0.12[0.07] −0.12[0.07]
Para professional 0.06 [0.05] 0.06 [0.05]
Medium skill 0.04 [0.05] 0.04 [0.05]
Large firm −0.03 [0.05] −0.03 [0.05]
Part time 0.03[0.05] 0.01[0.05]
Job seeker 0.02 [0.06] 0.02 [0.06]
Changed occupation −0.09*[0.03]
Changed industry −0.05 [0.04]
Observations 623 623
Log likelihood −354.87 −357.06
r2 0.04 0.04
J Labor Res (2012) 33:337–352 349
Table 6 Risk of displacement from re-employment job, changing occupation and changing
industry—marginal effects
Changed Did not change Changed Did not change
occupation occupation industry industry
JSM—direct approach 0.21* [0.08] 0.07 [0.08] 0.18* [0.07] 0.11 [0.10]
JSM—friends 0.12*** [0.07] 0.11 [0.08] 0.12*** [0.07] 0.19** [0.10]
JSM—other 0.05 [0.08] −0.01 [0.09] 0.01 [0.01] 0.09 [0.10]
Observations 328 295 382 241
Log likelihood −164.79 −179.77 −208.09 −141.07
pseudo r2 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.06
Notes: [ ] are the standard errors. *,**, *** denote signficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively
All other controls as per Table 5. Omitted categories in sets of dummy variables are formal
methods, less than high school completion, age 20–29 and low skill occupation
they took their post-displacement job. These results suggest that those who
change occupation are nine percentage points less likely to be subsequently
displaced from their re-employment job. There is no evidence that changing
industry reduces displacement risk. The occupation effect could occur for
one of two reasons. These individuals may have moved from an occupation
with declining demand, where the underlying risk of displacement is high,
to another occupation for which demand is not in decline. Alternatively, the
ability to move occupation may indicate the individual has more general skills
and/or higher productivity, which will be associated with lower displacement
risk irrespective of industry or occupation of employment.
If informal networks are stronger in the industry and occupation within
which the worker has previously been employed, the use of informal job search
methods may reduce the likelihood of changing occupation. If, in turn, chang-
ing occupation (or industry) reduces displacement risk, the use informal job
search methods may increase the subsequent risk of displacement. Table 2 sug-
gests that there is a relationship between job finding method and the likelihood
of changing occupation/industry. To investigate this further we re-estimate
the main model in Table 5 separately according to whether the individual
changed occupation or changed industry. Estimates are reported in Table 6
where for brevity only the estimates of job finding method are reported. If the
reason why informal job search methods increase displacement risk is due to
workers re-entering jobs similar to their displaced job where there is ongoing
poor demand conditions the impact on displacement risk should be larger
when workers do not change industry or occupation. This does not appear to
be the case. If anything the heightened risk of displacement associated with
informal job search methods is higher when the worker changed occupation or
industry.7 In unreported estimates a similar strategy was adopted for turnover
as a whole. Again there did not appear to be marked differences between the
impact of informal job search methods on turnover risk according to whether
7Although some care must be taken due to the imprecision of some of these point estimates.
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workers changed occupation/industry. Together these estimates suggest that
the heightened turnover and displacement risk associated with informal job
search methods is not due to re-employment in occupations or industries with
poor demand conditions. Instead they suggest that these job search methods
are associated more generally with unstable employment.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated the role of job search methods for displaced
workers. The use of informal job search methods appears to generate superior
wage outcomes in the initial re-employment job. There is evidence that re-
employment through friends/relatives or directly approaching employers re-
duces wage losses between displacement and post-displacement jobs, relative
to formal methods. This is supportive of the view that informal job networks al-
low displaced workers to signal productivity and provide superior information
on match quality (Simon and Warner 1992), and runs counter to suggestions
that employee referrals and social networks are associated with lower wages
(Bentolila et al. 2010).
A critical issue for displaced workers is job stability. It has previously been
demonstrated that recurring job loss is a major source of ongoing welfare losses
for displaced workers (Stevens 1997). In our data, the first re-employment
job appears to be short-lived. Approximately three quarters of re-employment
jobs end within the sample period. Those who find these jobs through informal
methods face a particularly high rate of turnover, and moreover a 14 to 16
percentage point increase in displacement risk. These results suggest that
displaced workers who use informal job networks as a method of gaining re-
employment are more likely to face ongoing labour market difficulties.
One explanation for these results is that informal job search is more
likely to result in jobs that are similar to the occupation and industry from
which the worker was displaced from. Whilst displaced workers who find re-
employment through informal job methods are less likely to change industry
and occupation, we find no evidence that this is the source of their greater
probability of turnover and risk of displacement. Instead, our results suggest
that jobs found through informal methods are associated generally with unsta-
ble employment. This suggests that formal job search methods, including using
the public employment agency, are associated with what could be considered
better job matching in the long term. This is potentially important insofar as
previous research on unemployed job seekers as a whole has demonstrated
that job search via public employment agencies is associated with generally
negative outcomes, especially longer unemployment spells and shorter post-
reemployment tenure (see for instance Blau and Robins 1990; Bishop 1993;
Addison and Portugal 2002). Our departure from these findings could reflect
both the type of individuals surveyed in our data set, who are in many ways
disadvantaged and the particular form of unemployment we are studying.
For instance, Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) found that it these types of indi-
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viduals for whom using UK public employment agency was most beneficial.
Further research is required to definitively establish the link between job
finding through public employment agencies and longer term job stability for
displaced workers. Any study of the Australian situation would be made more
complex by the movement to an outsourced public employment function with
non-government providers.
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Appendix





15 to 29 0.508
30 to 39 0.216
40 to 49 0.174
50 to 59 0.102
Non-english speaking background 0.159
Highest educational qualif ication
Less than high school 0.489
High school completion 0.160
Diploma/vocational training 0.292
Degree or higher 0.059












Large firm (100+ Employees) 0.262
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